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Giuseppe Semerari 
and the Experience 
of Philosophical Thought 
Augusto Ponzio and Maria Solimini 
Translated by Susan Petrilli 
1. Premise 
The title of the present paper recalls the title of a 1969 volume by 
Giuseppe Semerari, Esperienze del pensiero moderno, 1 where the term 
"experience" has a double meaning: an objective meaning referring to 
the itineraries and perspectives identifiable in the history of philo-
sophical thought; and a subjective meaning indicating Semerari' s own 
"learning and training" with respect to the former. 2 In this paper it is 
our intention to reconstruct some of the more important phases in 
Semerari's readings of authors and trends in philosophical thought 
throughout the course of his long career. In this perspective we 
assume the expression "of philosophical thought" in the double sense 
of the objective and subjective genitive: in other words, it is our inten-
tion to refer to Semerari's interpretation, "answering comprehension," 
and standpoint concerning given conceptions, approaches and choices 
in philosophical thought as they have emerged historically; as much as 
to the objective presence of the former in the development and orien-
tation of Semerari' s own research. 
2. Gnoseologism, ontology, history 
An author occupying a particularly important place in 
Semerari' s work and who at the same time is objectively one of the 
most original thinkers in contemporary European thought is Pantaleo 
Carabellese (1877-1948).3 Carabellese's critical ontologism aimed at 
being a form of idealism which he defined as "Italian idealism" oppos-
ing it to both post-Kantian German idealism and to the idealism of 
Croce and Gentile, both of whom he accused of gnoseological reduc-
tionism. As Semerari demonstrates, Carabellese's theoretical scope is 
far broader; his work belongs to that particularly significant process in 
twentieth century European thought-which, in accordance with 
Semerari, may be described as the "refounding of ontology". The 
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authors belonging to this current include Husserl, Hartmann, Bloch, 
and Heidegger in Germany; Lavelle, Le Senne, Sartre, and Merleau-
Ponty in France; and the later production of Lukacs in Central 
European culture. Semerari views the critical radicalization of the 
philosophical instances of modern thought as a characteristic feature 
of the refounding of ontology-which is not to be confused with the 
restoration of ontologisms of the Aristotelian-scholastic type-by con-
trast with philosophies hegemonized by the logic of Knowledge and 
thereby reductively stated in a gnoseologistic sense (idealism, neo-
Kantism, neopositivism, historicism, etc.).4 
Opposing gnoseology and scientism and instead taking his place 
in that critical orientation in European thought which problematizes 
the foundations of knowledge and scientific knowing, Carabellese rad-
icalized the classical Kantian question "How is knowing possible?" by 
posing the question of how consciousness is possible and how being is pos-
sible. 5 
Semerari devoted one of his early books Storia e storicismo. Saggio 
sul problema della storia nella filosofia di P. Carabellese (1953) to Pantaleo 
Carabellese's critical ontology, amplifying it in a second edition of 
1960 with the title modified to Storicismo e ontologismo critico;6 as well 
as a second volume La sabbia e la roccia. L'ontologia critica di Pantaleo 
Carabellese (1982), which contains essays published between 1962 and 
1980. 
The title of the 1953 monograph immediately evidences the prob-
lem of history in Carabellese's critical ontologism, being an antihistori-
cist ontologism and not an antihistorical ontology. He took a stand 
against historicism as the modern religion of history, ready to under-
stand and justify everything and which leads to crude political realism 
and to assertion of the values of force and power. Apart from 
Carabellese's manifest personal political position/ the objectively 
political character of his philosophy in his stance against historicism is 
made to emerge by Semerari through the reading he proposes in his 
first monograph on critical ontologism. The theoretical differences 
between critical ontology, on one hand, and the historicism of Croce 
and of Gentile on the other, subtend the practical difference between 
the model of direct democracy proposed by Carabellese and the mod-
els of liberalism (Croce) and fascism (Gentile). 8 In Storicismo e ontologis-
mo critico, Semerari identifies the objectively political character of 
Carabellesian ontology in the properly historicist attitude assumed by 
Carabellese, who was not content with the exaltation and passive 
acceptation of becoming nor with the deceptive negation of being 
abstractly opposed to becoming and understood as absolute aprob-
lematic presence, but rather who dealt critically and responsibly with 
the problem of the origin, in the Kantian and Husserlian sense of the 
foundation and validity of becoming. 9 Semerari was particularly inter-
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ested in underlining that, in Carabellese's critical attitude toward 
being, recognition of historicity identifies with the assumption of an 
attitude of control and of responsibility, two concepts which were to 
play a particularly important role in Semerari's subsequent philosoph-
ical reflection. 10 
Semerari observes that the historicism criticized by Carabellese is 
that of Hegel, Croce, and Gentile, which he ended by identifying with 
historicism as such, losing sight of aspects and orientations which 
escape such identification. According to Semerari, Carabellese was 
unaware of Dilthey and other exponents of German historicism. This 
was a particularly serious gap, especially as far as Dilthey was con-
cerned, given that-with the latter's assertion of the temporality of 
consciousness, the interpenetration of temporal moments and the 
interrelation of historical entities-among the historicists, Dilthey was 
the one who came closest to dealing with a problematic analogous to 
that dealt with by Carabellese. 11 
Semerari presents critical ontologism, therefore, as the radicaliza-
tion of historicism. Firstly because it recovers the temporality of exis-
tence as an essential structure in history. Therefore we may say of 
Carabellese's critical ontology what Lowith says of Heidegger's phi-
losophy, in other words, that existence is fundamentally historical 
insofar as it is radically temporal. 12 But Carabellese, observes Semerari 
in Storicismo e ontologismo critico, does not transfer, as does Heidegger, 
the foundation of the historicity of our there-being itself, Being that 
dominates prior to all entities and from which the there-being of man 
must take place. 
In this way Semerari begins his critical analysis of Heideggerian 
philosophy, which he was to develop subsequently throughout most 
of his works. 13 In his first monograph on Carabellese, Semerari links 
Heideggerian philosophy to one of the most steadfast dogmatic 
assumptions of Hegelism, the coincidence between being and nothing-
ness. 
If Hegel may be distinguished from Kant, this is because he replaces 
Kant's agnostic prudence with dogmatic certainty, all the more dogmatic 
insofar as it eliminated the reasons which had converted Kant to agnos-
ticism. Kant's doubt is Hegel's truth. Being and nothingness may coin-
cide, because being is the very not-being of experience, and experience 
as such is the not-being of being. The falseness of Hegelian immanence 
has no other origin than this acritical maintenance of the transcendental 
concepts of being and experience [ ... ] Profound criticalness is Hegel's 
true secret[ ... ]. Heidegger's philosophy of nothingness is the most pene-
trating interpenetration of Hegel's thought. The parable of being is 
traced between coming-into-being from nothing and being-for-death and 
Heidegger [of Was ist die Metaphisik?j14 can repeat with Hegel that pure 
being and pure nothing are therefore the same thing and find this thesis 
to be true. 1 
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In his book Sperimentazioni (1992 ), 16 Semerari begins the opening 
text, "Strategie del rassicuramento umano", with the following ques-
tion "why is there something and not rather nothing?". 17 This question 
which presupposes recognition of the contingent, of uncertainty, inse-
curitas as being essential to the human existential condition, proves to 
be disquieting and Semerari proceeds to demonstrate how 
Heideggerian ontology hastens to neutralize and silence it, asking yet 
another question, that is, what has happened to being? as preliminary to 
it. The philosophical question that Heidegger himself indicates as fun-
damental and that belongs to the categorical horizon of existence, that 
is, to the possible and the contingent, is, in this way, redimensioned. 
This means that man, thrust into insecuritas, must not search for salva-
tion in himself-in "natural succour", as Vico would say, in his tech-
niques of reassurance, obtained by working together with other men-
but must wait for it uniquely from its foundation, from that for which 
existence is thrust into risk, that is, Being, which, on the contrarx, is 
safe 18 and which allows the "person at risk" to "rest safely in risk". 9 
In Carabellese, with its alterity, plurality, temporality, and rela-
tion, existence is already a part of Being and does not depend on it a 
posteriori as that into which Being decays to existentialize itself. 20 
Carabellese contrasted the rock of concrete, temporal, plural, 
relational being in the light of which the problem of the origin, of the 
foundation, of validity cannot be given up, with the sand of historicist 
becoming, of the historicist succession of the facts in which law and 
value coincide with the succession itself. The metaphors of sand and 
rock used by the same Carabellese in his later writings are taken up by 
Semerari in the title of a 1982 book dedicated to critical ontologism. 
These metaphors give us a good idea of the fundamental theoretical 
instance relating to the problem of history. Such a theoretical instance 
is asserted by Carabellesian ontology in its opposition to historicism 
through the ontological recovery of time and of existence and by con-
trast as well with the interpretation, traceable in Heidegger, of time 
and existence as the outside, as the not of meta-temporal and meta-exis-
tential Being, that is, as its decayed phenomena. 21 
The elevation of time to ontological concreteness and the relative tempo-
ralization of being assure the bases of history, no longer excluded from a 
being closed in its eternal fixity nor identified with a being that, receiv-
ing history inside itself, changes because of this in empirical becoming 
and destroys itself as being and as history. 22 
In the ontology of Carabellese, therefore, we have history and 
temporality, and furthermore alterity, plurality and relation. According 
to Carabellese the subject is one, other, relation. Otherness is not con-
ceived a la Hegel as the negation of egoism, rather subjectivity is con-
stitutively other; unity and alterity of self open the self to plurality. 23 
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With respect to the recovery and development of Carabellese's 
thought the need most felt by Semerari, and already present in the 
1960 edition of his first monograph, is that of radicalizing existential 
analysis and overcoming the conscientialistic reduction of the concrete 
indentifiable in critical ontologism. In his essay of 1956 "Attualita e 
inattualita di Carabellese", subsequently published as an appendix in 
Storicismo e ontologismo critico,24 Semerari in fact remarks on two limits 
in particular in Carabellese' s ontologico-critical research: conscientialis-
tic interpretation of the concrete and partiality of existential analysis. The 
first limit is due to the fact that Carabellese, as his acceptance of ideal-
ism already reveals, opposed idealism from Hegel to Gentile not in 
principle but because of how it had been realized, that is, as false ide-
alism. His critique was directed above all at the cognitive preliminary 
issue from which idealism was to free itself, in order to found itself in 
a consciousness re-evaluated in all its diverse extra-cognitive expres-
sions such as religion, art, ethics, etc. The second limit, connected with 
the preceding, was identified in the fact that Carabellese does not 
develop his analysis of existence to the point of revealing finiteness as 
constitutive to it. And this has consequences for the reduction of the 
scope of his very important interpretation of intersubjective relational-
ity in terms of alterity. If, as Carabellese claims, each of the numerous 
selves is not finished with respect to the other, but is wholly opened to 
the latter, these selves cease to be singularities and existences in them-
selves, and merge into a unique self, a unique totalizing consciousness. 
That the intersubjective relation presupposes the finite character of 
existence escapes Carabellese, says Semerari, even if he perceives the 
implication of finiteness when he speaks of the transcendence of the 
self's otherness, thanks to which each one of us is unique and irre-
placeable.25 
Semerari considers Carabellese' s critique of the concrete as an 
important contribution to take up and develop, to reflect upon the 
original, precategorical unity of man and world subtending all predi-
cations and categorical determinations; such reflection is turned to 
unhinging what Carabellese called the "judicativa conception of exis-
tence," centered upon preference for cognitive experience and scientif-
ic knowing. 
What Carabellese calls concrete corresponds in the last analysis to what 
phenomenology with Husserl calls 'anti-predicative experience' and 
with Merleau-Ponty 'ambiguity'. 26 
This statement is from an essay of 1965-subsequently included 
as chapter three of La sabbia e la roccia, entitled "Lo scandalo linguisti-
co" -when Semerari was dealing with the problem of the existence-
alterity-world relationship from the perspective of phenomenology. 
However, it would be interesting to reconstruct the passages which 
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lead Semerari from critical ontologism to the phenomenology of 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. From this point of view, chapter eight, 
"Oltre lo storicismo," of Storicismo e ontologismo critico is significant, 
being one of the parts added to the 1960 edition with respect to that of 
1953. Here the fundamental programmatic indication is that the prob-
lem of history, after historicism, inevitably becomes that of its tran-
scendental constitution with respect to which, as Semerari wrote in his 
"Prefazione" to the above-mentioned re-edition, "truly decisive is the 
contribution made by Husserl and by Merleau-Ponty". 27 Concrete 
being subtracted from its dogmatic mummification is "that being of 
which with our there-being we are the transcendental condition". 28 
Semerari identifies a relation of analogy between the antihistori-
cism of phenomenology and of critical ontologism. Phenomenology 
reaches the same conclusions as critical ontologism, according to 
which modern historicism is no more than the point of arrival of the 
"doctrine of the self-concept", that is, of the subject that closes in upon 
itself, a subject empirically and psychologically understood, a subject 
self-elected to the status of being a mouthpiece for Truth and all other 
values. The phenomenological and ontologico-critical problem of his-
tory begins, says Semerari, just where historicism considers it solved. 
While historicism, similarly to naturalism, psychologism and posi-
tivism, absolutizes facts and believes it can solve the history of such 
absolutization, both phenomenology and critical ontologism, on the 
contrary, question the foundation, origin and value of history. It is sig-
nificant, observes Semerari, 29 that such an approach to the problemati-
zation of history is closely connected with the claim, advanced on both 
sides, to the necessity of metaphysics, and it is significant that the his-
toricists are not in a position to imagine any other form of metaphysics 
than that of the thing in itself and of antiquated ontologism. 
As for the fact that in affirming the theological, ontological and 
metaphysical character of philosophy, Carabellese is accused of 
archaism, the first prejudice we must free ourselves from, says 
Semerari, is that of the vulgar acceptation of metaphysics, theology and 
ontology. It is a question of verifying whether Carabellese's use of these 
terms on the basis of a 
severe logical and linguistic control, perhaps never before attempted, 
does justice to the old way of practicing metaphysics, theology and 
ontology. 
We shall then understand how, in Carabellese-but according to 
Semerari the same may be said of Husserl-
the refusal of historicism, of scientism and of worldliness is not properly 
the refusal or negation of history, of science and of the world, but rather 
the problem of the origin, of the foundation, of the validity of history, of 
science and of the world. 30 
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From a terminological point of view, a similar operation is 
accomplished by Merleau-Ponty-and Semerari's repeated association 
of the latter to Carabellese is no accident-when in spite of Kantian 
critique, neopositivist refusal and Heideggerian negation, he reasserts 
metaphysics as a central moment in philosophical reflection. Putting 
himself in a position that may be considered to be very close to 
Carabellese's critique of historicism, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
The sole object of metaphysical consciousness is everyday experience, 
this world, others , human history, truth, culture . But, instead of taking 
them ready-made , as consequences without premises and as though 
they were obvious , it rediscovers their fundamental[ly] alien character 
for me and the miracle of their appearance. Then the history of humani-
ty is no longer that inevitable advent of modern man moving from the 
caveman, that imperious growth of moral and science discussed by "too 
human" scholastic handbooks, it is not empirical and subsequent histo-
ry( ... ). Thus under stood metaphysics is the contrary of the system .31 
In Merleau-Ponty's view also-given his insistence on the corpo-
real, on intercorporeity, on perception, Semerari gives the latter's 
philosophical system special attention viewing it as the radicalization 
of phenomenology and explication of what remains hidden in it (as 
stated by Merleau-Ponty himself in his most recent essay on Husserl, 
"Le philosophe et son ombre")32-metaphysics implies being aware of 
existence in all its concreteness, and facing the problem of control and 
responsibility in the relationship with another and with the world, in 
all its radicalness. 
Antipsychologism and the assumption of the fundamental character 
of the intersubjective relation are the contact points indicated by 
Semerari in the last chapter of Storicismo e ontologismo critico between 
critical ontologism and phenomenology. And it is from this common 
basis-in the light of which both counteract the thesis that history and 
world coincide with judgment on them-that it is possible to begin 
our search for the sense of the world and for the conditions for judging 
about history as the premise for an attitude that is not passive toward 
it, but active and attributive of value. 
Semerari returns to the gnoseologism of Croce's historicism in an 
essay originally published in 1966, "Croce e la filosofia," and subse-
quently included in Esperienze del pensiero moderno, where Crocean phi-
losophy is considered from a biographical-philosophical and sociolog-
ical-cultural viewpoint and from the viewpoint of its configuration 
and validity as philosophical discourse. The opposition of philosophy 
as a methodology of historical knowledge to the sciences emptied of 
all theoretical value and reduced to the status of "edifice of pseudo-
concepts" contributed, says Semerari, to the gnoseologistic reduction 
of philosophy, emptying it, furthermore, on a theoretical level and lim-
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iting its cognitive field insofar as it is conceived as methodology of his-
torical knowledge, beyond being the cause for losing sight, among 
other things, of the concrete historical connection between the devel-
opment of philosophical thought and of science. "Croce defended and 
restored the classical concept of philosophy as knowledge and plain 
formality". 33 Ignoring the call to philosophy that is not mere contem-
plation of the world but contributes to a critique of the world and 
investment of value, indeed perhaps as a reaction to it, Croce discov-
ered the eternal categorical structures of historical judgment. 
The view of philosophy, from which nothing more than a description of 
how things went must be asked, was precisely the reproposition of the 
contemplativistic model of philosophy, which could not be separated 
from profound motives of ethical-social conservation, if relaunched in 
open and direct polemics against the philosophies of reforms (Comte) 
and social revolutions (Marx).34 
To the gnoseological reduction of philosophy in Crocean histori-
cism there corresponds, all the same, a precise ideological standpoint. 
This, on one side, renders Crocean historicism no less than Gentilian 
actualism, co-responsible toward the ideological genesis of fascism 
and, on the other, ties it to the interests of the South's agrarian bour-
geosie. In "11 neoidealismo nella filosofia italiana del primo '900," 
Semerari demonstrates, with documents, the clear political qualifica-
tion of Italian neoidealism "such that its most characterizing conceptu-
al structures were functions, guarantees and theoretical symbols of a 
given political choice" (35). It is now clear how the standpoint against 
Marxian philosophy as well as the gnoseological emptying of philoso-
phy had a very precise end in Italian neoidealism. 
The critique of Marxism is, in my view, the key to understanding the 
historical value of Italian neo-idealism, that which constituted the secret 
leitmotif of systematic constructions of Croce and of Gentile insofar as 
they were functional to the reordering and perpetuation of bourgeois 
power in Italian society( ... ) When we speak of neoidealistic reaction, we 
are alluding, at the most, to the antipositivistic offensive of Croce and 
Gentile [ ... ]. In reality, the neoidealistic reaction took place in two direc-
tions: it was the reaction to Marxism from the general point of view of 
the class, it was the reaction to positivism from the viewpoint of the con-
flict sustained, for some time, by the agrarian bourgeoisie of the South 
against the industrial bourgeoisie of the North. 36 
Considering Semerari' s subsequent theoretical thinking, an 
important moment of which is represented by his book Insecuritas. 
Tecniche e paradigmi della salvezza,37 it is interesting that in his paper of 
1966 on Croce he explains the final outcome of Croce's theoretical itin-
erary in the light of his request-both of an existential and of a social 
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and intellectual order-for personal security. Such security was 
reached by Croce delusively at the cost of his pathetic refusal of the 
status of insecuritas as the structural condition of the human being and 
through reductionisms and simplifications. Such an attitude consented 
both his return to Hegel, which ignored, or better, silenced the disqui-
eting questions of post-Hegelian thought posed by Kierkegaard, 
Feuerbach, Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche and Freud, as well as the rigid 
schematization of his "philosophy of the spirit" which blocked, but 
only on the level of intentions and ideology, the fluid and unpre-
dictable dynamics of life: existence, culture, history. If, on the contrary, 
Croce had focused on the status of insecuritas as the original living 
human condition instead of exorcising it with the mystifications of his 
philosophy, he would have explained the genesis of categories, logic, 
culture and knowledge, instead of never interrogating himself as to 
how they were formed, despite of the fact that he declaredly identified 
philosophy with history. 38 
Inverting the parts, Croce made his position pass as being true to 
history and as anti-metaphysical; in reality, his philosophical system 
reproposed old-style metaphysics where the state of being secure and 
stable is represented by History in its historicist-idealistic acceptation; 
and he achieved this by presenting his philosophy as methodology of 
history. 
In his book Sperimentazioni, Semerari points to Croce as a clear 
example of an exchange between metaphysics and methodology 
where the reassuring function of philosophy is fulfilled through mysti-
fication. 
To say, with Croce, that philosophy is no more than the methodology of 
history, is the trick through which the metaphysics of the 'Philosophy of 
the Spirit' imposes itself at a methodological level.39 
An analogous example is offered by Vico, the founder of the his-
torical sciences and guardian of Crocean historicism. In Vico, Semerari 
traces both the connection between methodology and metaphysics, as 
well as the reduction of metaphysics to the status of an apofogetic and 
rhetorical expedient useful to the end of rejecting, restraining-search-
ing for firm points and inviolable boundaries in the sphere of religious 
tradition and common sense-the new vision of the world and of man 
as put into perspective by the development of the physical and mathe-
matical sciences. In Vico's view (Scienza Nuova, I, Degnita XII e XIII), 
common sense is a judgment without any reflection, commonly felt by a 
whole order, by a whole peoples, by a whole nation, by the whole of the 
human race and it is taught to nations by divine providence. 
In "Sulla metafisica di Vico," a text included in Esperienze del pen-
siero moderno and which develops a conference held in 1968, Semerari 
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thoroughly examines Vico's "metaphysics of common sense". To cri-
tique Vico he contrasts the moderation of individual will and the sub-
jective uncertainties to be achieved through education in common 
sense. The latter is privileged both insofar as it is conveyed as a system 
of judgments of not human but divine provenance; as well as on the 
basis of the rhetorical expedient that avails itself of quantity consider-
ing more valid that which can make a claim to universal consensus or 
to the greatest number of people. 40 
In another essay originally published in 1968, also taken up again 
in Esperienze del pensiero moderno, Semerari, analyzing the complex 
relationship between Vico and Descartes, shows how Vichian anti-
cartesianism taken globally is the expression of 
an attitude of resistance and defence against the philosophical develop-
ment of the new mathematical and experimental science [ ... ], a cultural 
tactics devised, more or less consciously, to the end of quieta non 
movere, of leaving things as they are, limiting, as far as possible, the 
field of action of new methodology which would seem to be dangerous 
for the natural course of ideas and for common sense.41 
In the opening essay entitled "Strategie del rassicuramento 
umano," included in his previously-mentioned book of 1992, 
Sperimentazioni, Semerari refers to Vico as an example of the strategies 
of human reassurance provided by religion. 
That extraordinary page in Scienza nuova where G. B. Vico perspects 
Religion as reassurance for man deprived of natural reassurances, of 
"aids provided by nature" [ ... ] has probably not been studied enough as 
yet. The expression naturali soccorsi must be extended to the techniques 
of reassurance or to all of what man, in the horizon of his mundane and 
social existence, exploiting his own capacities, invents, organizes and 
maintains under his control to the end of reassurance. Historical reli-
gions constitute, in their essential nature, nothing more and nothing less 
than more or less complex institutional apparatuses whose difference 
with respect to scientific and political techniques is that according to the 
latter, man lets his own reassurance, his own salvation depend in the 
last and decisive analysis on something he admits to be beyond his 
powers of control. 42 
This inclination to confide in something necessarily secure and 
safe in itself, such as faith, may be traced back to Vico himself. In the 
light of Semerari's critique, despite its theoretical distance from Vico 
and its programmatic intention, this is what appears to be common to 
both Vico (considered to be the leader of idealistic historicism) as well 
as to Heidegger ( one of the major recognized exponents of the refoun-
dation of ontology), as we shall see more clearly in what follows. 
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3. Existence, reason, science 
The critique of gnoseologism conducted by Carabellese's critical 
ontology is traced by Semerari back to Husserlian phenomenology. It 
is significant that Semerari, as a means of indicating certain essential 
aspects of phenomenology, should recall the final paragraph of Krisis 
der europaischen Wissenschaften, where the need of reconstructing the 
unity, the organicity of reason is asserted, intending not only logical 
reason, but also practical and aesthetic reason. 43 
Semerari has laid particular stress upon a note in Husserl's diary 
dated 25 September 1906, where he writes the following: 
In the first place I name the general task which I must solve for myself, if 
I wish to call myself a philosopher. I am referring to the critique of rea-
son. I cannot live truly and truthfully without clarifying, along general 
lines, the sense, essence, methods, fundamental points of view of the cri-
tique of reason, without having imagined, projected, established and 
founded a general outline for them. 44 
What in Semerari's view is important and particularly significant 
in characterizing Husserlian phenomenology is the connection-as 
this autobiographical note clearly puts into evidence-established 
between the construction or reconstruction of the critique of reason 
and living "truly and truthfully," that is, living authentically and 
therefore living between philosophical research and existence. As 
Semerari writes: 
In Husserl's perspective the critique of reason ceased being a scholastic, 
abstractly intellectual exercise, or the resolution of merely methodologi-
cal and epistemological issues and became a profoundly existential 
problem involving the sense itself of life and of deliverance from the tor-
ments of doubt and of the lack of clarity and certainty. It is in relation to 
the critique of reason thus understood that Husserl's slow and fatiguing 
work takes on meaning for the elaboration of appropriate techniques of 
reassurance in relation to skepsis and crisis, especially in the forms (and 
their variants) in which they imposed themselves in his time: psycholo-
gism, naturalism, relativism, anthropologism, historicism, philosophies 
of the Weltanschauung. 45 
Semerari evidences the significance of Husserl's critique of rea-
son which he connects to concrete living by contrasting it above all to 
1) the gnoseologism of Kantian critique, which, restricting the horizon 
of knowledge, reduces the problem of reason to the problem of the 
limits of reason and not also to its origins, sense and value; 2) 
Hegelian philosophy, in which "the phenomenology of reason is, in 
reality, no more than the ontological description of a system aprioristi-
cally concluded", which by eliminating the antidogmatic character of 
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Kantian critique, decrees "the end of the critique of reason as pure rea-
son";46 3) dogmatism, which in (common with idealism) presents posi-
tivism as a variation of historicism. The problem of the critique of rea-
son as it appears before Husserl's phenomenology is therefore, 
according to Semerari, the problem of the crisis of reason, and this crisis 
appears as the crisis of the transcendental.47 Husserlian phenomenology 
proposes the reconstruction of the critique of reason reconducted to 
the subject of living experience, not the empirical, psychological sub-
ject, but the transcendental subject; more precisely, reconducted to 
transcendental intersubjectivity as that from which we are able to retrace 
the sense of reason, establish its validity as formal reason, find the 
meaning for man in its techniques, operative, categorical and linguistic 
structures. 48 Therefore, Husserlian phenomenology 
returns to the problem of Critique in the very point of its greatest 
aporeticity, where Critique is converted into dogmatism, subsequently 
and variously inherited by idealism, naturalism and historicism. 49 
It is in the light of this problematic design that Semerari reads the 
overall itinerary of Husserl's research from Philosophie der Arithmetik 
through to Logische Untersuchungen and from these to Krisis der 
europiiischen Wissenschaften: what generally emerges from such an itin-
erary is the problematization of reason as human reason. This involves 
recognizing the inseparable connection with responsibility, with a rad-
ically antidogmatic attitude on the basis of which philosophy as a "rig-
orous science" is the critique of institutionalized forms of knowledge, 
the knowledge of common sense and of the sciences. In fact, philoso-
phy thus understood probes into the process of the formation of 
knowledge as from the Lebenswelt, reconducting it to human control 
and orienting it as a function of a (continuously reproblematized) telos, 
in which man may intersubjectively find himself and to which he may 
answer in the first person. Semerari reads the critique of reason in a 
Husserlian perspective as a problem of insecuritas, existential uncer-
tainty faced without recourse to prejudices, dogmatisms, and assump-
tions free of verification, but, on the contrary, through the assumption 
by man of a radically responsible attitude. It is in the perspective of 
such radicalization that transcendental reduction, the transformation 
of external experience (Erfarung) into internal experience (Erlebnis), the 
passage from reduction to constitution, the question of self-responsi-
bili ty (Selbst-verantwortung) posed in Krisis der europiiischen 
Wissenschaften, but also in the introduction to a Formal und traszenden-
tale Logic should be considered. The world must be reconsidered as it 
appears in its being as it is for us, taking as a starting point the possi-
bility that the subject has of being able to answer for it. This subject in 
fact calls itself into question as an empirical subject, as a psychological 
subject, consolidated in its habits, automatisms, and stereotypical 
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behaviors, and places itself, instead, as an a priori condition, a tran-
scendental subject, determining being, sense and value. The crisis of 
the European sciences consists in the separation between science and 
human existence, between science and the assumption of responsibili-
ty by man toward the world, himself and others. 
It is interesting that Semerari should contrast Krisis, considered a 
text of fundamental importance for an understanding of our times, to 
Heidegger's Brief iiber den "Humanismus": such an opposition would 
seem to indicate the contrast between the exact assertion of 
Heideggerian antihumanism-based on the hypostatization of the 
observation of the being of things as it presently is, with an ensuing 
reduction of men to the mere status of men as they in fact are-and the 
project for a new humanism to be constructed on the basis of a new 
science to which especially philosophy as a rigorous science has the 
task of contributing .50 What an acritical acceptance of behavioral 
norms, scientism, technicism and the subjection of science to produc-
tion for production's sake, has caused us to lose sight of and objective-
ly annul is the humanism of a new science essentially intended as to 
reconduct knowledge, including scientific knowledge, to its original 
function of control, self-responsibility and reciprocal responsibility. 
At the conclusion of his life Husserl realized that science was slipping 
away from man's control and, instead of eliminating existential insecuri-
ty, increased it. The final call to the responsibility and self-responsibility 
of man-with which Krisis closes-took on the same meaning as refer-
ence to consciousness against the effects of a natural attitude and all 
forms of thought linked to 'prejudice of fact' had had in Husserl 's Ideen. 
But, all the same, Husserl did not give up science . He would have never 
undersigned the proposition that Heidegger was to dictate a few 
decades later: 'Only a God can save us' . Science was not to be repudiat-
ed, but simply inscribed in a new perspective inspired by and taking off 
from the principle of responsibility. The critique of reason needed to be 
transformed into the critique of the conditions of possibility of being 
responsible and self-responsible. 51 
From this point of view, the difference between Vico, who 
refused to give up his fideistic attititude, including faith in "common 
sense," and Husserl is obvious; and is clearly put into evidence by 
Semerari in a note to his previously cited paper, "Intomo all' anticarte-
sianesimo di G. B. Vico". Similarly to Vico, Husserl (in paragraphs 9 
and 34 in Krisis) criticizes Galileo Galilei, who on discovering nature 
"concealed" it insofar as he substituted for nature itself a mathematical 
interpretation of it, thereby proposing, in his turn, a "new science". 
But Galileo Galilei develops the latter as a science of precategorical 
(existential and subjective-transcendental) foundations of the objective 
sciences and in terms of a radical critique of common sense and of the 
obviousness of a pre-determined world. As far as Descartes is con-
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cerned, Husserl's critique, profoundly divergent from Vico's, substan-
tially accepts the Cartesian view of the Cogito, 
concerning which he reproaches Descartes for not having fully under-
stood its deep and overwhelming meaning. 52 
Semerari focuses particularly on the relationship between 
Husserl and Galileo Galilei in a 1965 essay, "La filosofia scientifica di 
Galilei", 53 which is of particular interest due to its analysis of a rela-
tionship among different languages. Despite Husserl's critique of 
Galileo Galilei, Semerari singles out the following points in common 
between them: the Galileian reference to things themselves, to the sen-
sible as the place of authentication, to acknowledgment of the primacy 
of sight over the other senses, to the assumption of experience as the 
basis of scientific construction. But the point of differentiation and in a 
certain sense of incommensurability between Husserl and Galileo 
Galilei is identified by Semerari in the reference to Schellin~' s third 
lesson on "Uber die Methode des academischen Studium", 4 where 
natural science is considered as an immense philology and nature as a 
system of linguistic levels, of linguistic stratifications. 
Schelling's thesis of the plurality of languages may reconcile Galileo 
Galilei' s position, who discovered and appreciated a single language-
the mathematical-with Husserl's position, who refused to reduce the 
multiple languages of nature, with its added possibilities of multiple sig-
nification, to a single language and to a single mathematical meaning. 
Though he is not m istaken, Husserl's critique of Galileo Galilei is 
improper: to the end of his own research, the latter was only interested 
in one particular type of language, while, on the contrary, Husserl pro-
posed a linguistic theme linked to a scientific and philosophical post-
Galileian problematic .55 
In an essay entitled "Crisi e critica della ragione" in La crisi delle 
scienze europee (1981),56 Semerari enquires into the theoretical-historical 
interconnection between the critique of reason, the crisis of sciences and 
the crisis of reason, focusing on given turning points in the history of 
philosophical thought. A fourth aspect emerges in this interconnection, 
that of the crisis of the transcendental, the other face of the crisis of rea-
son involving the loss of its sense, function and foundation which can 
only be retraced by rediscovering the problematicity, insecurity and 
precariousness of the existential human condition. 
The first phase Semerari identifies in the historical development 
of philosophy is the crisis of primitive cosmological science, on the 
basis of objective changes which have intervened in the historico-
social structure. These changes find expression first in Parmenides 
with his assertion of a concept of reason as opposed to the delusori-
ness of sensorial experience, and subsequently with Protagoras, who 
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may be considered the first to have elaborated a critique of reason 
expressed in the assertion of man as the measure of all things. At the 
same time, this reply may be considered as: 
a discovery, even of course, of the transcendental as the criterion of differ-
entiation between the knowable and the non-knowable, between being 
and not-being, between true and false. It is a question, furthermore, of a 
transcendental which, given its extreme simplicity, would seem to be 
free from the mythologies with which its more refined forms were sub-
sequently to appear paradoxically charged [ ... ]57 
The second case is the crisis determined by the advent of modern 
experimental science, by a radical shift in world view caused by geo-
graphical discoveries, by the questioning of religious authority in the 
Reformation: a crisis of certainty and security to which the Cartesian 
Cogito is a critical reply. Semerari agrees with Derrida that the Cogito 
is not only reason and order, but also madness and disorder, the 
source from which reason and madness are diversified. 58 Interestingly 
enough, Semerari also underlines that, despite the possibility of tran-
scendental function, of precategorical foundation inherent in the 
Cogito-the measure used by Protagoras-nonetheless in Descartes the 
Cogito, rather than being maintained at the level of the pre-categorical, 
propends for reason which is identified with the mathematical order 
of the natural universe, thereby absolutizin?s a categorical structure 
considered as the unique model of rationality. 9 
The third case is represented by the crisis of philosophy and of 
the natural sciences faced by Hume, and which he believes he can 
solve with an appeal to "human nature" as the epistemological princi-
ple of all knowledge, "the science of man science" being the basis of 
philosophy and of science, given that the mathematical and the natur-
al sciences are also formed by taking the knowledge of man as their 
starting point. Semerari claims that the "science of man" is the Humean 
critique of reason, and despite its being vitiated by comparison with the 
reductivism of the Cartesian Cogito by ahistoricity, its approach to the 
pre-categorical is far broader and its problematization of the transcen-
dental, deeper. With respect to the Humean critique of reason, a step 
backwards is represented by the "epistemological artifice and fiction 
of the Kantian I think, 'one and identical' ", which is the result of 
extrapolation and hypostatization of the logico-linguistic structures of 
the mathematics and physics of the times, leading to identification of 
theoretical reason, no differently from the Cartesian Cogito, with its 
mathematical model. 60 
With Husserlian phenomenology, the problem of the crisis of the 
sciences-seen above all as a problem of the loss of sense and value for 
human existence and as a problem of the critique of reason viewed as 
a profoundly existential problem-is dealt with through the recovery 
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of intersubjective intentionality which carries out a teleological func-
tion and in this sense is constitutive, transcendental with respect to 
constituted objectivity ; and therefore through a radical critique of a 
world presented as absolute, existing for its own sake, as a system of 
determinations which belong to it obviously. 
In this sense-says Semerari-a phenomenological critique recognizes 
its debt to Hume and Kant with whom, even more than with Descartes, 
the problem of transcendental constitution arises, even if Hume loses 
himself in sensualism and Kant does not know how to seriously distin-
guish between psychology and transcendentalism. 61 
Among the authors who have most contributed to the constitu-
tion of the historico-existential paradigm of the philosophical prob-
lematization of science, indicated by Semerari with the Vichian expres-
sion "new science" 62-contrasting it to "syntax" which only covers the 
technical-formal aspects of science-Marx holds a particularly impor-
tant place. Marx is viewed in this perspective by Semerari in his essay 
"Materialismo e scienza naturale" (1972) included in a book of 1973 
Filosofia e potere, as well as in an unpublished paper of 1980 "11 para-
digma della 'scienza nuova' e la sua forma marxiana", subsequently 
developed in Sperimentazioni.63 While agreeing with Althusser that 
"Marx elaborates a new science, a system of scientifically new con-
cepts," Semerari is in fact using a completely different interpretation of 
the word "science" with respect to Althusser, who "lends (imposes 
upon) Marx a formalistic (philistine!) notion of science", which is in 
fact "refuted" by Marx's works. The scientificalness of the Marxian cri-
tique of political economy is not based on the self-reflection of science 
as prescribed by the paradigm of syntax, but on anthropological radical-
ism and on the integral historicization of the laws of political economy. 
This is how Marx obtains his 'epistemological break', which does not 
take place within his works-as Althusser imagines-that is, between 
the so-called ideological period and the so-called scientific period, but 
rather between his work considered generally (for the sake of clarity, 
from his Introduction of 1843 to Capital) and the whole preceding tradi-
tion in both philosophical (idealistic and materialistic-mechanistic) and 
economic-political thought. 64 
4. Relation, freedom-necessity, value 
In relation to the itinerary that leads from the Cartesian Cogito to 
the critique of reason in transcendental terms, Spinoza's philosophy 
may be considered as an obstacle, a deviation from the transcendental 
level to an objectivistic-naturalistic metaphysics, beginning with 
Descartes. This is substantially the interpretation Husserl gave of 
Spinoza in Erste Philosophie (1923-1924) and in Phiinomenologische 
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Psycologie (1925) and which remained unvaried in his posthumous 
work Die Krisis (1954), even though in the latter Spinozian ethics is 
considered as "the first universal ontology" that attempts to unite 
physics and psychology, and searches for their original relationship. 
While agreeing with an interpretation that evaluates Spinoza's 
role in developments on the theme of the transcendental, 65 Semerari' s 
evaluation is far broader. He begins with works on Spinoza which he 
subsequently reorganizes in his 1952 book, I problemi dello spinozismo,66 
develops in Benedetto Spinoza (1968) 67 and continue analyzing 
throughout his career . Semerari also interprets Spinoza's philosophy 
in its relationship with Husserl's phenomenology 68 remarking upon 
the particular common points: the correspondence between Spinoza's 
concept of "regeneration" and Husserl's "epoche"; the analogous 
approach to the method of philosophy considered as liberation from 
"prejudices"; the relationship which had already been perceived by 
Spinoza between the order of things and dispositions of the mind; the 
reconducting of science, already present in Spinoza, to the pre-categor-
ical level of existence, making of the former an expedient for existen-
tial reassurance. 69 
What mainly interests us now in Semerari' s reading of Spinoza 
are his references to the themes of relationality and the freedom-neces-
sity relationship, which in Spinoza's philosophy and in Semerari's 
interpretation of it receive special attention. As to the first theme, spe-
cially interesting is a page from I Problemi dello spinozismo ( ch. I) where 
Semerari makes the observation that Spinoza founds "not a literal 
monism, but a profound pluralism" underlining its "metaphysical 
unity", on the basis of which the many mutually recognize and relate 
to each other. That this is central in the very orientation of Spinoza's 
philosophy, even if he may not have been "fully aware" of this-here 
too a reflection on what forms the "shadow" of the philosopher as 
intended by Merleau-Ponty-is demonstrated by the claim to the reali-
ty of individuals in relation to the universals or entities of reason, 
which at the level of political philosophy implies recognizing the 
juridical properties of the individual-citizen in relation to the State. In 
this sense, says Semerari, 
Spinoza criticizes Leibniz, before Leibniz criticizes Spinoza, Spinoza 
explictly anticipates the aporias of Leibnizian philosophy, which histori-
cally would seem to remedy the apparent logical void of Spinozism . The 
Leibnizian restoration of traditional transcendence deprives the plurali-
ty of monads of the unifying element which, alone, can justify the relat-
ing of monads to monads, otherwise closed in subjective claustral 
worlds, vainly accorded by mythical pre-established harmony. For 
Spinoza the true starting point is not God, but experience of his multi-
plicity, and monism is the result of a metaphysical view within the mul-
tiplicity. 70 
160 DIFFERENT/A 
As for the second theme, in a chapter entitled "La liberta" in I 
problemi de/lo spinozismo, referring to Spinoza's assertion that freedom 
consists in consciousness of one's own nature-including the corpore-
al structure of the self: "the first and direct object of mental activity is 
the body" ("obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est cor-
pus")-to which we are necessarily bound, and in acting as a conse-
quence, Semerari underlines the important conclusion that may be 
drawn from Spinoza's doctrine, that is, that freedom and responsibili-
ty are indissolubly connected, 71 so that 
Freedom is not a patrimony given to us to administer, but a value of 
industriousness that we construct, instant by instant, during the course 
of existence, individual and group existence, and of humanity, trans-
forming potential possibility into effective reality, according to our 
forces and capacity. [ ... ] Freedom and liberation are not two, but one. 
And freedom is achieved in and through liberation [ ... ]72 
Both these themes are central in Schelling's philosophy, another 
philosopher to whom Semerari has dedicated various studies, includ-
ing the volumes Interpretazione di Schelling73 (1958), Da Schelling a 
Merleau-Ponty (1962), Introduzione a Schelling (1971).74 
Semerari's interpretation of Schelling has the special merit of 
having contributed to freeing him from interpretative modules which 
have fundamentally remained subordinate to a Hegelian definition, 
according to which Schelling acts as a mediator between Fichte and 
Hegel; as well as both from a reading in the perspective of culturalism 
as inaugurated by Dilthey and from Lukacs who, apart from not tak-
ing his distance from Hegel, evaluates Schelling-as does 
Kierkegaard-in terms of irrationalism. 75 
As early as his paper, "Dell'io come principio della filosofia" 
(1795), Spinoza plays an important role in the development of 
Schelling's thought and in separating it from Fichte's philosophy. 
Semerari states that 
the I is the name used by Schelling to designate in a Fichtian climate 
Spinoza's absolute Substance [ ... ] . Similarly to Spinoza's Substance, 
Schelling's I reproposes the beginning and end of freedom .... 76 
Furthermore, as Schelling was to say in his 1809 reprint, the I is 
never interpreted as subjective but as absolute, that is, as identity 
between the subjective and the objective. 77 Schelling's absolute is 
understood in relational terms, as the relation between the finite and 
the infinite, intuition and concept, real and ideal. By contrast with 
Kant, Schelling does not place the category of relation at the same 
level of all other categories, but at their foundation, so that 
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one may see how the Absolute is the hypostatizing definition of the original 
form of thinking, in other words, the entification of the category of relation 
[ ... ] The philosophy of nature and idealism unite with the Absolute thus 
originated and structured and it is because of this union that Schelling 
himself was frequently to call the philosophy of identity ideal-realism 
[ ... ] To understand Schelling's Absolute either as thought or pure infi-
nite, in which being is decided, or as being and pure finite in which 
thought is decided is to fall into one of two opposite and unilateral ten-
dencies-abstract materialism and abstract idealism, objectivism and 
subjectivism-against which fights the philosophy of identity formed on 
the relational and antipredicative structure of the Absolute. 78 
And it is on the basis of the assertion of the antipredicative fun-
damentality of the relation that Schelling's ideal-realism, beyond con-
trasting with the alternative idealism/ realism, opposes mechanism 
both on a cognitive and scientific level as well as on a practical level; 
furthermore, it too resorts to the concept of metaphysics as the oppo-
site of all mechanisms and as an organic manner of feeling, thinking 
and acting. Semerari sees in Schelling's Absolute, understood as the 
absolute form of the relation and principle of relation, beyond a sub-
stan tialistic and pre-existentialistic interpretation common to 
Schelling's naturalism and to Spinozism ,79 the assertion of original 
ambiguity as the direct object of philosophizing. This may be used to 
address the crisis of traditional science based on mechanistic models 
thanks to the new situation provoked by the development of the sci-
ences and of knowledge in general beyond those models .80 
Similarly to Spinoza, Schelling's Absolute guarantees autonomy 
of the finite from the infinite, of being from the idea without implying 
a return to the Kantian opposition. Precisely because the absolute is 
the relation of the finite and the infinite, of the real and the ideal, in the 
Absolute the finite is not decided in the infinite, but on the contrary, it 
never ceases to be finite, because the Absolute never ceases to be a 
relation. 
With a proposition that is far less paradoxical in the facts than what 
would appear in its formulation, we could state that the Absolute in the 
philosophy of identity is the principle of verification of the impossibility of 
any kind of absolutization. Fichte in the last analysis is right in objecting 
[ ... ] that the philosophy of identity should be called rather philosophy of 
nothingness, for here the Absolute becomes nothing as it transforms into 
a relation. But what is annulled is the old absolute, the foundation of 
individualistic, mechanistic and abstract philosophies which, as the 
advent of Fichtian idealism has shown, remains in the formalism of the 
void of knowledge from which they free themselves through recourse to 
faith. 81 
Of some interest is Semerari' s insistence on the radicalization of 
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Spinozism in Schelling through the latter's assumption of the problem 
of the temporal finite, an issue which Spinoza left aside and which, once 
the Absolute becomes an antipredicative relation, as it does for 
Schelling, cannot be ignored given that the finite as the difference from 
all other finites to which, as such, it relates, presupposes tem~orality 
as a constitutive structure and coincides with its very existence. 2 
The difference with respect to Spinoza also concerns the contin-
gency/ necessity relationship, which Semerari links to the transforma-
tion of Spinozian mechanistic naturalism into Schelling's relational 
and organistic naturalism, which, from this point of view, "presents 
itself as an upturned Spinoza". In fact, as a consequence of his return to 
Spinoza though Fichte's idealistic-pragmatic perspective, Schelling 
substitutes Spinoza's "causalistic necessity a parte ante" with "finalistic 
necessity a parte post".83 This is possible in Schelling for whom the phi-
losophy of nature is not merely the science of determinism and mecha-
nism-to which the same Spinoza remains connected in spite of his 
critique of Descartes-so a connection is established between the 
dynamic process of nature and the concept of freedom. In "La liberta", 
chapter IV of Introduzione a Schelling, 84 Semerari underlines the differ-
ence established by Schelling on these basis with respect to Spinoza 
concerning his concept of freedom (which he develops in his work of 
1809, Philosophische Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der Menschliche 
Freiheit.) Here Schelling asserts that freedom cannot be made simply to 
consist in the dominion of intelligence over the sensible and over the 
appetites, thereby grasping only its negative aspect. In its positive 
aspect freedom is decision, participation in the active process of life as 
relation and organicity, and nonetheless, as in Spinoza, freedom is 
necessity, the assumption of the necessity of one's own nature. 
However, Semerari attaches special importance to Schelling's concep-
tion of freedom as "the discovery of the irrational as the foundation", 
that is, the evidencing of an irrationalistic residue of the individual 
personality and the identification of the nature of God with blind will, 
with an obscure will to exist. This 
upturned the classical tradition of philosophy restored in those years 
and reaccredited by Hegel in terms of the most rigorous absolute ratio-
nalism, and placed something not conceptual and not formally rational 
at the foundation of the historical process of the world: need, that is, the 
simple will to exist" .85 
In Schelling's view, consciousness is produced from the produc-
tion of the unconscious which constitutes, in his words, "the transcen-
dental past of the I" as consciousness. In this way, Schelling's philoso-
phy 
augusto ponzio & maria solimini 163 
inaugurates the wa y through which Marx, Nietzsche, Freud were to 
attack the absolute sovereignty of consciousness-an authentic pillar of 
modem ideology [ ... ].86 
Schelling thus contributes to the advent of contemporary con-
sciousness. In Semerari' s view the meaning and value of such con-
sciousness coincide in the transition from argumentative reason (Pascal 
is another important author to be remembered in considering the 
problematic relative to the Cartesian Cogito, mechanism, and scientific 
physicalism), 87 that is, from reason as the art of persuasion used by 
man without being compromised, to projectual reason identified with 
the human subject itself as it struggles to give sense and value to its 
own existence. It is in this perspective-considering, that is, the prob-
lem of reason and science in connection with man's struggle for 
responsibility and control, for the constitution of values and for the 
conditions of possibility to answer for them, so that science may not 
only be seen as the science of means but also of ends, that is, as the 
will to rationalize ends and values in man's life88-that Semerari eval-
uates the contribution of Nietzsche's philosophy: 
Stripped of all equivocity, the Nietzschean super-man acts as a regula-
tive ideal for a theology of human reason oriented toward the evidence 
of life understood as the responsibility of man who inhabits the world 
and wishes to be realized by determining himself in expression that is 
no longer contradicted by his nature. 89 
The will to power consists in passing from belief in things as they 
are to the willing their transformation, their having to become thus. From 
this point of view, the "will to power" intended as the will of the exis-
tent to preserve itself and grow according to its possibilities, is inter-
preted by Semerari as the recognition of existential precariousness in 
the development of life itself. And knowledge does not emerge as "a 
luxury", as an end in itself, but as a function of life.90 The Nietzschean 
critique of values leads to an awareness of the fact that the latter are 
anticipated and planned in relation to a concrete problematic situation, 
as the end of existential choices and as the possibility of positive 
choice. 91 According to Semerari, Nietzschean philosophy is therefore 
the development and radicalization of philosophical speculation as 
inaugurated by such authors as Hume and Kierkegaard, beyond the 
Humean ahistoricity of the "science of man" and the religious bent of 
the Kierkegaardian paradox. 92 
Semerari characterizes Hume's "philosophical melancholy," as 
discussed in the Treatise of Human Nature, as 
the symbol of philosophy, which, having detracted validity from certain-
ty, incapable of justif ying itself to the very end, sets man, without com-
promise, before the radical problematicity of his existence and of the 
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insecurity of his being. 93 
Humean philosophical melancholy is manifested as the philoso-
pher's deeply felt solitude caused by the impossibility of conforming 
and passively adapting to the rules, to institutionalized practices and 
to the customs of social cohabitation. A situation which does not 
denote superb separation and intellectual self-exaltation, but, on the 
contrary, humble recognition of the condition of simplicity and pure 
passion that characterizes the "poor existent single man" as 
Kierkegaard expresses himself, evidencing in his concluding non-sci-
entific gloss (Afsluttende uvidenskabeling Efterskrift) the paradoxical 
relationship of such a condition with Truth conceived as eternal and 
essential. Semerari refers to Hume's melancholy as a way of situating 
Schelling's thought, observing that the "melancholy and desperation" 
confessed by Schelling in Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung 
(1842) and ensuing from the inability of philosophy to establish the 
end and true reason of the world, 
are the evidence of the failure of a philosophical adventure-that 
attempted by Kant and Hegel-which, beyond appearances and despite 
the impressiveness of its theoretical constructions, ends by eluding the 
inexorable questions posed by Hume, against which it does not measure 
itself frankly and courageously. This also happens because such a philo-
sophical adventure would otherwise be obliged to take apart and 
demolish most of the German philosophical tradition which, on the con-
trary, it wishes to reconfirm and further develop in the perspective of a 
'Risorgimento' revival of German national culture. 94 
Contrary to Spinoza who maintained that contingency is only a 
defect of our intellect, contemporary philosophy increasingly evi-
dences our categorical horizon in terms of the possible or the contin-
gent.95 From this point of view, Semerari highly considers Sartre's con-
tribution, whose Roquentin, the protagonist in La nausee announces 
the "extraordinary discovery" that "the essential is the contingent[ ... ]; 
"by definition existence is not necessity [ ... ]",96 demonstrating in L'Etre 
et le Neant, that, being ourselves and the world Contingency, implies 
that Contingency can only be ignored or masked through an act of bad 
faith. According to Semerari the great distance between Sartre and 
Heidegger clearly emerges at this point: in fact, while for the latter 
what has been hidden in the history of philosophical thought and 
must now be reasserted is Being, for Sartre instead what has been for-
gotten and masked is contingency and existential anguish, which have 
been hidden and disguised by reassuring pretense: 
In a certain sense, Sein und Zeit and L'Etre e le neant count as the poles of 
an alternative which contemporary thought is called to bet on: whether 
to continue variously masking Contingency or, instead, to finally take 
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Contingency seriously in all its implications beginning with nothing-
ness.97 
In Semerari's opininon, Sartre's limit in L'Etre e le Neant consists 
in his absolutization of freedom, which annuls the motivation of the 
choice, in the absolutization of freedom which involves the exclusion 
of responsibility. On this point Semerari establishes a convergence 
between the Sartrean conception of freedom and the antinomy of 
Croce's philosophy of freedom, despite divergence as to their point of 
departure: by absolutizing history Croce annuls the relationship of his-
tory to freedom and, therefore, to responsibility as freedom of choice; 
by absolutizing freedom Sartre annuls any possibility of the relation-
ship of freedom to history and, therefore, to responsibility of one's 
own present choice in the face of conditioning by the past. 98 
Absolute freedom and abstract absolute determinism coincide, but the 
concrete remains freedom relative to a conditioning temporal (that is situa-
tional) determination.99 
Semerari believes that Sartre's merit is fundamentally, instead, 
his "disenchanted humanism" whose manifesto may be considered to 
be "Materialisme et Revolution". 100 Taking up L'Etre et le Neant and 
anticipating Critique de la raison dialectique, "Materialism and 
Revolution" asserts the contingency of human existence and trans-
formability of the collective order and system of values. It is signifi-
cant, says Semerari, that against such disenchanted humanism we 
have the reaction, from two opposite philosophical fronts, of 
Heidegger with his "Brief iiber den 'Humanismus'" and of Lukacs 
with his "Existentialism or Marxism?". Indeed, disenchanted human-
ism can neither be approved by the person who understands the 
human solely in terms of an opening to Being, nor by the person who 
views man's problems in the perspective of a mechanical reflexologi-
cal relationship between consciousness and being, and through an 
interpretation of Marxism that is dogmatic and subordinate to 
Stalinism. 101 
5. Post-idealistic Italian philosophical thought: 
The genesis and formation of neoilluminismo 
In a 1968 essay entitled "11 neoilluminismo filosofico italiano," 102 
["Italian Philosophical Neoenlightenment"] which refers to the 
revival, after the second World War, of the free exchange of Italian phi-
losophy with the rest of the cultural world from which it had been iso-
lated by neoidealism and fascism, Semerari cites an observation made 
by Augusto Guzzo, who realized at the time "that the issues which 
torment us these days had to find a solution elsewhere other than ... in 
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the panlogism of Croce and of Gentile". 103 
This essay paved the road for a revaluation of a twentieth-centu-
ry "tradition" which comprises thinkers such as Giuseppe Peano, 
Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni and Federico Enriques. It also looks 
at the actualism of Antonio Aliotta, the originality of Carabellese's crit-
ical ontologism and the great efficacy of Antonio Banfi' s critical ratio-
nalism, especially as they relate to Windelband's and Cassirer's Neo-
Kantism, Husserlian phenomenology, Simmel's philosophy of life, and 
historical materialism . 
As regards Banfi' s neorationalism, and underlining what he con-
siders to be one of its constant characteristics as delineated in what 
Fulvio Papi calls the "School of Milan",104 Semerari identifies a main 
theme in the recovery of life for philosophy freed from all empty for-
malisms. As a confirmation, Semerari remembers that with the 
appearance of one of the most significant texts of the "new course", La 
vita come ricerca by Ugo Spirito in 1937, Giulio Preti, an exponent of the 
"School of Milan," observed that Spirito was breaking with actualism 
and proceeding in the same direction as critical rationalism. In the 
1930s the connection between philosophy and life, expressed program-
matically by Banfi in Principi di una teoria della ragione (1926), opened 
critical rationalism, similarly to the European philosophy of those 
years, to the problem of existence, which Banfi assumed not in its 
abstract immediacy but in the totalizing movement of reason contrast-
ing with all dogmatic closure. 105 
As a description of the philosophical climate in Italy during the 1930s, 
nothing is more appropriate than the words spent by Banfi in an essay 
of 1934, Sui principi di una filosofia morale-"it is not thought that teaches 
life to live, but life that teaches thought to think" -and the Platonic say-
ing-kalos o kindunos-reproduced by Abbagnano as the opening motto 
to La struttura dell'esistenza of 1939. The debate of the 1930s concentrated 
on life and on problematicity at the limit of not-being . A brief survey 
would show how many of the most significant books of those years bear 
the term life or a more or less equivalent term such as experience or exis-
tence in the title: Vita di Galileo by Banfi, La filosofia e la vita by Calogero, 
La vita come ricerca by Spirito, L'esperienza e l'uomo by Lombardi, La strut-
tura dell'esistenza by Abbagnano. 106 
Despite the differences between them, critical rationalism, exper-
imentalism, the philosophy of mathematics and of science, and Italian 
pragmatism all commonly contributed to freeing reason from idealistic 
and historicist dogmatism. On this basis Italian neoenlightenment began 
to flourish during the 1940s, sharing with historical Enlightenment the 
focus in philosophical reflection on problems relating to reason and 
science. This "structural pluralism", as Semerari calls it, 107 of Italian 
neoenlightenment, consisting in the fact that it was represented by 
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thinkers different in provenance and ideological formation, found its 
common denominator in the general attitude that considers the prob-
lems of man's world and of his existence as remaining rigorously in 
the human world, in the natural and social horizon of man himself. 
This enabled recover y of the truth of positivism without in the mean-
time leaving aside the subject, and therefore recovery of the truth of 
idealism, beyond dogmatic developments in these two philosophical 
currents. Nicola Abbagnano's positive existentialism, Giulio Preti's 
pragmatic neopositivism, Remo Cantoni' s historicist humanism, the 
methodological rationalism of Norberto Bobbio and of Ludovico 
Geymonat, the revival of phenomenology thanks to Enzo Paci and the 
group belonging to the review "Aut-Aut", to which Semerari himself 
belonged, all inhabit in different guises the sphere of neoenlighten-
ment. 
Semerari insists particularly on the connection between this 
"third phase" 108 in twentieth-century Italian philosophy, represented 
by neoenlightenment, and the anti- and post-idealistic ferments of 
Italian contemporary philosophy left on the margins during the 
dominion of idealism . So, while reconstructing the formation process 
of Nicola Abbagnano' s positive existentialism, Semerari shows that 
this line of thought may be understood not so much by considering it 
in relation to European existentialisms as by viewing it as a "critical 
radicalization and development" of the experimentalism of Antonio 
Aliotta, which influenced Abbagnano. 109 Aliotta's assertion of the 
necessity of "philosophizing humanly," of considering, that is, the 
human point of view as the "only one possible from which we do and 
can philosophize" ;11° his revindication of the pluralistic character of 
experience both at the level of form with the consequent critique of 
preference for the gnoseological, as well as at the level of the irrepress-
ible multiplicity of individual points of view due to their relative 
impenetrability; the acknowledgment of the data of experience-inso-
far as it is pluralistic, relativistic, relational-as possibilities; and final-
ly his radicalization in the sphere of human existence, considered in all 
its dramatic and ambiguous character, of the moral destiny of man: all 
this finds development in Abbagnano's positive existentialism as it 
develops out of Aliotta' s experimentalism and finds expression in a 
1923 book entitled, Le sorgenti irrazionali del pensiero. Furthermore, 
beyond being a continuation of Antonio Aliotta's experimentalism, 
Semerari demonstrates that the necessary transition towards positive 
existentialism accomplished by Abbagnano subsequently in II principio 
della metafisica (1936) through his recovery of ontological thought as 
against gnoseologistic metaphysics, the reduction of philosophy to 
mere methodology, and the foundation of ontology in the horizon of 
existence, is also connected with Carabellese's critical ontologism, 
explicitly evoked by Abbagnano. Carabellese' s critical ontologism is 
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characterized by the effort towards the antipredicative dimension of 
being and the overcoming of all subjective and objective hypostatiza-
tion of the ontological structure. 111 
Analogously, Semerari traces links in Enzo Paci's research with 
the thought of Banfi who was led to the critique of neo-Kantian tran-
scendentalism of the Marburg School and to the need of a connection 
between thought and being. This also led him to the problem of ontol-
ogy and to the radicalization and problematization of transcendental-
ism: "which marked his existentialism and differentiated him from 
that positive existentialism presented by Abbagnano in 1939 with La 
struttura dell'esistenza and to [that] with which Paci is habitually associ-
ated" .112 Semerari shows how Paci reached existentialism on his own 
account and with his own motivations with respect to Abbagnano, just 
as Abbagnano, differently from what the same Paci believed, in other 
words, that positive existentialism was the synthesis of Heidegger and 
Jaspers, reached the same conclusion through the experimentalism of 
Antonio Aliotta and the ontological reflection of his 1936 book. 
In the last analysis the distinction between Paci and Abbagnano consist-
ed in their different understanding of the same existentialistic experi-
ence, which derived from the difference between transcendentalism and 
experimentalism. This was to be translated into the difference in theoret-
ical direction according to which Abbagnano and Paci were subsequent-
ly to continue their philosophical efforts, methodological empirism 
(Abbagnano) and an explicit relationistic elaboration (Paci), moving off 
from a common existentialistic phase. 113 
In three books which appeared between 1938 and 1940, Il signifi-
cato del Parmenide nella filosofia di Platone, Principii di una filosofia del-
l'essere and Pensiero esistenza e valore, Paci dealt simultaneously with 
the question of the radical problematization of transcendentalism, the 
existential radicalization of Banfi' s transcendentalism, and the refor-
mulation of ontology. In the claim to complementarity between the 
models of transcendentalism and ontologism, Semerari sees the begin-
ning of Paci's relationistic choice, even if he avails himself of it at a 
strictly methodological level. 114 This explains Paci's strongly positive 
attitude towards the problematic nature of La vita come esistenza by 
Ugo Spirito "for having conducted theoretical research to a maximum 
point of transcendental problematicity and for having reached, at the 
same time and moving in the same direction, the plan of existence". 115 At 
the same time, Paci was interested in the recovery of the ontological 
theme which had matured in European philosophy between the 1920s 
and the 1930s. In his "Preface" to Principii di una filosofia dell'essere, Paci 
explicitly recalls the refounding of ontologism with direct reference to 
Hartmann and Carabellese, as Semerari observes: 
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After the 1930s Paci no longer returns to the thought of Carabellese, but 
it is significant that when in 1954 he published his first broader exposi-
tion of relationism, he gave it a title with a Carabellesian flavour, Tempo e 
Relazione, and, when he committed himself to the elaboration of his rela-
tionistic phenomenology, he centered it...on time and relation. 116 
Semerari identifies in a relationistic perspective that which 
remains constant throughout the whole of Pad's research from the ini-
tial existentialistic phase to the declaredly relationistic phase and on 
through to the final phenomenological-Marxian phase. A spokesman 
now of Whitehead, now of Merleau-Ponty, now of Husserl, now of 
Marx, or an eclectic in the pejorative sense of the term, in Semerari' s 
view, Paci still is the philosopher among Italian philosophers of his 
generation who developed with the greatest awareness and coherence 
the meaning of the characteristic signs of the culture of our century, 
focusing throughout his career on the principle of relation as opposed 
to the principle of substance (as dominated in physics, biology, psy-
chology, the social sciences). The work of Paci "is the Italian laboratory 
of the epochal passage from the substantialistic to the relationistic way 
of thinking". 117 
In "Filosofia e storia" (1967), Semerari observes that in the sphere 
of philosophical historiography 
historical research cannot ignore, absolutely, neither the logical and 
structural forms of philosophical discourse, nor the multiple ties which 
unite, compromising it, philosophy to the life of mankind and of soci-
eties, nor above all the specific theoretical impulse which coincides with 
philosophizing and on which historical knowledge itself depends (if I 
do not have theoretical interests in philosophy I cannot have any 
authentic interest in its history either) and, in the last analysis, the possi-
bility of all history. 118 
This is best exemplified precisely by Semerari's work during the 
course of his complex but fruitful theoretical reflection on the history 
of philosophical thought; and, we shall have reached our goal if-we 
have succeeded in conveying an idea of its consistency and breadth. 
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